ASTUTE OF CREATIVE ENIGMA
Those who have handled sciences have been either men of experiment or men of dogmas. The men of experiment are like the
ant, they only collect and use; the reasoners resemble spiders, who make cobweb
s out of their own substance. But the bee takes a middle course: it gathers its material from the flowers of the garden
and of the field, but transforms and digests it by a power of its own. Not unlike this is the true business of philosophy;
for it neither relies solely or chiefly on the powers of the mind, nor does it take the matter which it gathers from natural
history and mechanical experiments and lay it up in the memory whole, as it finds it, but lays it up in the understanding
altered and digested. Therefore from a closer and purer league between these two faculties, the experimental and the rational
(such as has never yet been made), much may be hoped.
|
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
Francis Bacon Razzamatazzing on Human understanding:
(# 1) The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion (either
as being the received opinion or as being agreeable to itself) draws all things else to support and agree with it. And though
there be a greater number and weight of instances to be found on the other side, yet these it either neglects and despises,
or else by some distinction sets aside and rejects, in order that by this great and pernicious predetermination the authority
of its former conclusions may remain inviolate. And therefore it was a good answer that was made by one who, when they showed
him hanging in a temple a picture of those who had paid their vows as having escaped shipwreck, and would have him say whether
he did not now acknowledge the power of the gods — "Aye," asked he again, "but where are they painted that were drowned
after their vows?" And such is the way of all superstition, whether in astrology, dreams, omens, divine judgments, or the
like; wherein men, having a delight in such vanities, mark the events where they are fulfilled, but where they fail, though
this happen much oftener, neglect and pass them by. But with far more subtlety does this mischief insinuate itself into philosophy
and the sciences; in which the first conclusion colors and brings into conformity with itself all that come after, though
far sounder and better. Besides, independently of that delight and vanity which I have described, it is the peculiar and perpetual
error of the human intellect to be more moved and excited by affirmatives than by negatives; whereas it ought properly to
hold itself indifferently disposed toward both alike. Indeed, in the establishment of any true axiom, the negative instance
is the more forcible of the two.
(#2). The human understanding is moved by those things most
which strike and enter the mind simultaneously and suddenly, and so fill the imagination; and then it feigns and supposes
all other things to be somehow, though it cannot see how, similar to those few things by which it is surrounded. But for that
going to and fro to remote and heterogeneous instances by which axioms are tried as in the fire, the intellect is altogether
slow and unfit, unless it be forced thereto by severe laws and overruling authority.
(#3) The human understanding is unquiet; it cannot stop or rest, and still
presses onward, but in vain. Therefore it is that we cannot conceive of any end or limit to the world, but always as of necessity
it occurs to us that there is something beyond. Neither, again, can it be conceived how eternity has flowed down to the present
day, for that distinction which is commonly received of infinity in time past and in time to come can by no means hold; for
it would thence follow that one infinity is greater than another, and that infinity is wasting away and tending to become
finite. The like subtlety arises touching the infinite divisibility of lines, from the same inability of thought to stop.
But this inability interferes more mischievously in the discovery of causes; for although the most general principles in nature
ought to be held merely positive, as they are discovered, and cannot with truth be referred to a cause, nevertheless the human
understanding being unable to rest still seeks something prior in the order of nature. And then it is that in struggling toward
that which is further off it falls back upon that which is nearer at hand, namely, on final causes, which have relation clearly
to the nature of man rather than to the nature of the universe; and from this source have strangely defiled philosophy. But
he is no less an unskilled and shallow philosopher who seeks causes of that which is most general, than he who in things subordinate
and subaltern omits to do so.
(#4). The idols imposed by words on the understanding
are of two kinds. They are either names of things which do not exist (for as there are things left unnamed through lack of
observation, so likewise are there names which result from fantastic suppositions and to which nothing in reality corresponds),
or they are names of things which exist, but yet confused and ill-defined, and hastily and irregularly derived from realities.
Of the former kind are Fortune, the Prime Mover, Planetary Orbits, Element of Fire, and like fictions which owe their origin
to false and idle theories. And this class of idols is more easily expelled, because to get rid of them it is only necessary
that all theories should be steadily rejected and dismissed as obsolete.
But the other class, which springs out of a faulty and unskillful abstraction, is intricate and deeply rooted. Let us take
for example such a word as humid and see how far the several things which the word is used to signify agree with each
other, and we shall find the word humid to be nothing else than a mark loosely and confusedly applied to denote a variety
of actions which will not bear to be reduced to any constant meaning. For it both signifies that which easily spreads itself
round any other body; and that which in itself is indeterminate and cannot solidize; and that which readily yields in every
direction; and that which easily divides and scatters itself; and that which easily unites and collects itself; and that which
readily flows and is put in motion; and that which readily clings to another body and wets it; and that which is easily reduced
to a liquid, or being solid easily melts. Accordingly, when you come to apply the word, if you take it in one sense, flame
is humid; if in another, air is not humid; if in another, fine dust is humid; if in another, glass is humid. So that it is
easy to see that the notion is taken by abstraction only from water and common and ordinary liquids, without any due verification.
There are, however, in words certain degrees of distortion and error. One of the least faulty kinds is that of names of
substances, especially of lowest species and well-deduced (for the notion of chalk and of mud is good, of earth
bad); a more faulty kind is that of actions, as to generate, to corrupt, to alter; the most faulty is of qualities
(except such as are the immediate objects of the sense) as heavy, light, rare, dense, and the like. Yet in all these
cases some notions are of necessity a little better than others, in proportion to the greater variety of subjects that fall
within the range of the human sense.
(#5). So much, then, for the mischievous authorities of systems, which are founded either
on common notions, or on a few experiments, or on superstition. It remains to speak of the faulty subject matter of contemplations,
especially in natural philosophy. Now the human understanding is infected by the sight of what takes place in the mechanical
arts, in which the alteration of bodies proceeds chiefly by composition or separation, and so imagines that something similar
goes on in the universal nature of things. From this source has flowed the fiction of elements, and of their concourse for
the formation of natural bodies. Again, when man contemplates nature working freely, he meets with different species of things,
of animals, of plants, of minerals; whence he readily passes into the opinion that there are in nature certain primary forms
which nature intends to educe, and that the remaining variety proceeds from hindrances and aberrations of nature in the fulfillment
of her work, or from the collision of different species and the transplanting of one into another. To the first of these speculations
we owe our primary qualities of the elements; to the other our occult properties and specific virtues; and both of them belong
to those empty compendia of thought wherein the mind rests, and whereby it is diverted from more solid pursuits. It is to
better purpose that the physicians bestow their labor on the secondary qualities of matter, and the operations of attraction,
repulsion, attenuation, conspissation,1 dilatation, astriction, dissipation, maturation, and the like; and were
it not that by those two compendia which I have mentioned (elementary qualities, to wit, and specific virtues) they corrupted
their correct observations in these other matters — either reducing them to first qualities and their subtle and incommensurable
mixtures, or not following them out with greater and more diligent observations to third and fourth qualities, but breaking
off the scrutiny prematurely — they would have made much greater progress. Nor are powers of this kind (I do not say
the same, but similar) to be sought for only in the medicines of the human body, but also in the changes of all other bodies.
|
 |
|
 |
Philosophy..........nature..
Those who have taken upon them to lay down the law of nature as a thing already searched out and understood, whether they
have spoken in simple assurance or professional affectation, have therein done philosophy and the sciences great injury. For
as they have been successful in inducing belief, so they have been effective in quenching and stopping inquiry; and have done
more harm by spoiling and putting an end to other men's efforts than good by their own. Those on the other hand who have taken
a contrary course, and asserted that absolutely nothing can be known — whether it were from hatred of the ancient sophists,
or from uncertainty and fluctuation of mind, or even from a kind of fullness of learning, that they fell upon this opinion
— have certainly advanced reasons for it that are not to be despised; but yet they have neither started from true principles
nor rested in the just conclusion, zeal and affectation having carried them much too far. The more ancient of the Greeks (whose
writings are lost) took up with better judgment a position between these two extremes — between the presumption of pronouncing
on everything, and the despair of comprehending anything; and though frequently and bitterly complaining of the difficulty
of inquiry and the obscurity of things, and like impatient horses champing at the bit, they did not the less follow up their
object and engage with nature, thinking (it seems) that this very question — viz., whether or not anything can be known
— was to be settled not by arguing, but by trying. And yet they too, trusting entirely to the force of their understanding,
applied no rule, but made everything turn upon hard thinking and perpetual working and exercise of the mind.
Now my method, though hard to practice, is easy to explain; and it is this. I propose to establish progressive stages of
certainty. The evidence of the sense, helped and guarded by a certain process of correction, I retain. But the mental operation
which follows the act of sense I for the most part reject; and instead of it I open and lay out a new and certain path for
the mind to proceed in, starting directly from the simple sensuous perception. The necessity of this was felt, no doubt, by
those who attributed so much importance to logic, showing thereby that they were in search of helps for the understanding,
and had no confidence in the native and spontaneous process of the mind. But this remedy comes too late to do any good, when
the mind is already, through the daily intercourse and conversation of life, occupied with unsound doctrines and beset on
all sides by vain imaginations. And therefore that art of logic, coming (as I said) too late to the rescue, and no way able
to set matters right again, has had the effect of fixing errors rather than disclosing truth. There remains but one course
for the recovery of a sound and healthy condition — namely, that the entire work of the understanding be commenced afresh,
and the mind itself be from the very outset not left to take its own course, but guided at every step; and the business be
done as if by machinery. Certainly if in things mechanical men had set to work with their naked hands, without help or force
of instruments, just as in things intellectual they have set to work with little else than the naked forces of the understanding,
very small would the matters have been which, even with their best efforts applied in conjunction, they could have attempted
or accomplished. Now (to pause a while upon this example and look in it as in a glass) let us suppose that some vast obelisk
were (for the decoration of a triumph or some such magnificence) to be removed from its place, and that men should set to
work upon it with their naked hands, would not any sober spectator think them mad? And if they should then send for more people,
thinking that in that way they might manage it, would he not think them all the madder? And if they then proceeded to make
a selection, putting away the weaker hands, and using only the strong and vigorous, would he not think them madder than ever?
And if lastly, not content with this, they resolved to call in aid the art of athletics, and required all their men to come
with hands, arms, and sinews well anointed and medicated according to the rules of the art, would he not cry out that they
were only taking pains to show a kind of method and discretion in their madness? Yet just so it is that men proceed in matters
intellectual — with just the same kind of mad effort and useless combination of forces — when they hope great
things either from the number and cooperation or from the excellency and acuteness of individual wits; yea, and when they
endeavor by logic (which may be considered as a kind of athletic art) to strengthen the sinews of the understanding, and yet
with all this study and endeavor it is apparent to any true judgment that they are but applying the naked intellect all the
time; whereas in every great work to be done by the hand of man it is manifestly impossible, without instruments and machinery,
either for the strength of each to be exerted or the strength of all to be united.
Upon these premises two things occur to me of which, that they may not be overlooked, I would have men reminded. First,
it falls out fortunately as I think for the allaying of contradictions and heartburnings, that the honor and reverence due
to the ancients remains untouched and undiminished, while I may carry out my designs and at the same time reap the fruit of
my modesty. For if I should profess that I, going the same road as the ancients, have something better to produce, there must
needs have been some comparison or rivalry between us (not to be avoided by any art of words) in respect of excellency or
ability of wit; and though in this there would be nothing unlawful or new (for if there be anything misapprehended by them,
or falsely laid down, why may not I, using a liberty common to all, take exception to it?) yet the contest, however just and
allowable, would have been an unequal one perhaps, in respect of the measure of my own powers. As it is, however (my object
being to open a new way for the understanding, a way by them untried and unknown), the case is altered: party zeal and emulation
are at an end, and I appear merely as a guide to point out the road — an office of small authority, and depending more
upon a kind of luck than upon any ability or excellency. And thus much relates to the persons only. The other point of which
I would have men reminded relates to the matter itself.
Be it remembered then that I am far from wishing to interfere with the philosophy which now flourishes, or with any other
philosophy more correct and complete than this which has been or may hereafter be propounded. For I do not object to the use
of this received philosophy, or others like it, for supplying matter for disputations or ornaments for discourse — for
the professor's lecture and for the business of life. Nay, more, I declare openly that for these uses the philosophy which
I bring forward will not be much available. It does not lie in the way. It cannot be caught up in passage. It does not flatter
the understanding by conformity with preconceived notions. Nor will it come down to the apprehension of the vulgar except
by its utility and effects.
Let there be therefore (and may it be for the benefit of both) two streams and two dispensations of knowledge, and in like
manner two tribes or kindreds of students in philosophy — tribes not hostile or alien to each other, but bound together
by mutual services; let there in short be one method for the cultivation, another for the invention, of knowledge.
And for those who prefer the former, either from hurry or from considerations of business or for want of mental power to
take in and embrace the other (which must needs be most men's case), I wish that they may succeed to their desire in what
they are about, and obtain what they are pursuing. But if there be any man who, not content to rest in and use the knowledge
which has already been discovered, aspires to penetrate further; to overcome, not an adversary in argument, but nature in
action; to seek, not pretty and probable conjectures, but certain and demonstrable knowledge — I invite all such to
join themselves, as true sons of knowledge, with me, that passing by the outer courts of nature, which numbers have trodden,
we may find a way at length into her inner chambers. And to make my meaning clearer and to familiarize the thing by giving
it a name, I have chosen to call one of these methods or ways Anticipation of the Mind, the other Interpretation
of Nature.
Moreover, I have one request to make. I have on my own part made it my care and study that the things which I shall propound
should not only be true, but should also be presented to men's minds, how strangely soever preoccupied and obstructed, in
a manner not harsh or unpleasant. It is but reasonable, however (especially in so great a restoration of learning and knowledge),
that I should claim of men one favor in return, which is this: if anyone would form an opinion or judgment either out of his
own observation, or out of the crowd of authorities, or out of the forms of demonstration (which have now acquired a sanction
like that of judicial laws), concerning these speculations of mine, let him not hope that he can do it in passage or by the
by; but let him examine the thing thoroughly; let him make some little trial for himself of the way which I describe and lay
out; let him familiarize his thoughts with that subtlety of nature to which experience bears witness; let him correct by seasonable
patience and due delay the depraved and deep-rooted habits of his mind; and when all this is done and he has begun to be his
own master, let him (if he will) use his own judgment.
FRANCIS BACON
BEAUTY WITH A PURPOSE
miss coloumbia
MISS WORLD PEGEATRY has gone far to help the whole world at large than the initial purpose
o r the uterior motive in the minds of those who initiated it. Where politics finds difficult to penetrate , women of beauty
always have their way to reach out to the masses fustrated by war, the less priviledges roamiong the streets,
and the enviroment under siege of war. Beauty with a definite purpose is what is making the difference for
now. Every thing given to man is for a purpose.
LONDON, England -- Turkey's Azra Akin has won the 2002 Miss World
crown at the controversial pageant, which was moved to Britain from Nigeria after deadly riots there.
The 2002 contest has been dogged by violence, boycotted by some of its own contestants, and is now faced with legal action.
Akin beat Miss Colombia Natalia Peralta and Miss Peru Marina Mora Montero, in second and third place respectively, to win
the title at the competition broadcast to 142 different countries from London's Alexandra Palace.
Miss World 2001 Agbani Darego, from Nigeria, placed the crown on the head of Akin, who beamed and waved at the crowd.
"I hope I will represent the women of the world in a good way," Akin told reporters.
" I am very honoured to be Miss World," she said, wearing her Miss World sash over a red dress. "I think it is good for
a woman to have this position, and I hope I can make a difference."
The new Miss World, who turns 21 on Sunday, was raised by her Turkish parents in the Netherlands, plays the flute and listed
her passions as ballet and belly dancing.
The international pageant was forced to pull out of Nigeria last month after Muslim-Christian rioting left more than 200
people dead.
But organizer Julia Morley, whose late husband Eric launched Miss World in 1951, was undeterred and hastily moved the event
to London, where it was hosted by Sean Kanan, an actor from U.S. soap "The Bold and The Beautiful."
Organizers say the show, whose motto is "beauty with a purpose," had a global audience of more than two billion. In Britain,
however, where the pageant is widely seen as a quaint, kitsch spectacle, no television channel agreed to broadcast it.
Miss World is used to controversy.
In 1970, feminists threw bags of flour during the event, which was hosted by Bob Hope at the Royal Albert Hall in London.
In 1996, when the finals were held in the Indian city of Bangalore, police fired tear gas and rubber bullets at rock-throwing
protesters, and one man committed suicide by self-immolation.
Still, this was arguably the contest's most troubled year.
The controversy began when a number of contestants boycotted the competition after an Islamic court in Nigeria condemned
a woman to death by stoning for having a child outside marriage. The Nigerian government promised the sentence would not be
carried out, and Morley pressed ahead.
But violence erupted when a Nigerian journalist wrote an article claiming the Muslim prophet Muhammad would have approved
of the contest and might even have taken one of the contestants as his bride. The result was the deadly rioting in the northern
city of Kaduna.
|
 |
|
|